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ABSTRACT
In May, 1997, the United Nations General Assembly
adopted the Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, a treaty
that largely codifies the general principles of
international water law.  While not entirely free from
controversy, the Convention has already been influential
and will doubtless continue to be well into the 21st
century.  This paper provides an overview of the
Convention, comments on some of its salient provisions,
and considers its future influence.
INTRODUCTION
The Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational
Uses of International Watercourses was adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly on May 21, 1997.1  It
had been negotiated in a specially convened “Working
Group of the Whole” of the Sixth (Legal) Committee of
the General Assembly, on the basis of draft articles
adopted by the UN International Law Commission (ILC)2
after some twenty years work on the project.3  The
Convention is a general, framework agreement
containing thirty-seven articles, which are divided into
seven parts, and an Annex on Arbitration.  Its provenance
can be traced to a resolution adopted in 1970 by the UN
General Assembly calling upon the ILC to study the law
of international watercourses with a view to its
progressive development and codification.4  This short
paper will focus on provisions of the Convention that are
of particular significance.
OVERVIEW OF THE CONVENTION
The hydrologic scope of the Convention is determined by
its definition of the term “international watercourse.”  It
is natural to think of this expression as being synonymous
with “international river,” but as used in the Convention
it is in fact much broader.  The definition takes into
account that most freshwater is actually underground, and
that most of this groundwater is related to, or interacts
with, surface water.  Thus, for example, pollution of
surface water can contaminate groundwater, and vice
versa, just as withdrawals of groundwater can affect
surface water flows.  Article 2 therefore defines
“watercourse” as “a system of surface waters and
groundwaters constituting by virtue of their physical
relationship a unitary whole . . . .”  This definition calls
attention to the interrelationship between all parts of the
system of surface and underground waters that make up
an international watercourse.  Thus it should be clear that
an effect on one part of the system will generally be
transmitted to other parts.  Let us assume, for example,
that an aquifer which interacts with a surface stream is
intersected by the border between states A and B.
Withdrawals of groundwater from that aquifer in country
A can affect groundwater levels in state B.  They may
also affect surface flows in state B to the extent that the
aquifer contributes to those flows.  Despite the hydrologic
futility of excluding this essential part of a watercourse
system from legal regulation, the inclusion of
groundwater was cited by two states as a reason for their
abstentions from the vote on the Convention.5
There is another point concerning groundwater, which
constitutes by far the largest source of freshwater,6
excluding polar ice caps and glaciers – although these are
melting at alarming rates.  The point is that an important
source of groundwater is not covered, at least expressly,
by the Convention.  That source is so-called “confined”
groundwater, also known in some regions as “fossil
water.”  This is groundwater that does not interact with
surface water.  It does not receive contributions from the
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surface nor does it contribute to surface water flows.
While relatively rare, it is an important source of water in
some arid regions and is shared by two or more states in
certain of them.  It is these latter cases, where confined
groundwater is intersected by a boundary, that fall outside
the Convention's definition of “international
watercourse.”
The ILC did not see fit to include this form of
groundwater within the scope of its draft articles.
Instead, at the conclusion of its work on international
watercourses it adopted a resolution on confined
transboundary groundwater, in which it recommended
that states apply the principles contained in its draft
articles to this form of groundwater.7 The Convention is
entirely silent on the matter, the Working Group having
accepted the ILC's definition of “international
watercourse.”  This raises the question whether, despite
its exclusion from the Convention, confined
transboundary groundwater is nevertheless governed by
the same fundamental principles – such as equitable
utilization and protection against pollution – that apply to
international watercourses as defined in the Convention.
It seems reasonable to conclude that the same basic
principles do apply to this form of groundwater, although
the degree of diligence required in the protection of
confined groundwater would probably be much higher,
given the fact that any pollutants introduced into such
aquifers would not escape except through withdrawal of
water by humans.  The Commission may have been
overly cautious in deciding not to include confined
transboundary ground water in its draft, even though it
came very close to doing so in its resolution on the
subject.
The core of the Convention is contained in Part II,
General Principles.  Part II is introduced by what is
perhaps the Convention's most important provision:
Article 5, Equitable and Reasonable Utilization and
Participation.  This article sets forth what many regard as
the cornerstone of the law of international watercourses
– namely, the principle that a state must use an
international watercourse in a manner that is equitable
and reasonable vis-à-vis other states that share it.  The
converse is, of course, also true: States have a right to an
equitable share of the uses and benefits of an
international watercourse.8  The International Court of
Justice (ICJ - the “World Court”), in its recent decision in
the Gabíkovo-Nagymaros case, confirmed the centrality
of this principle when it emphasized the importance of
operating the project involved in the case “in an equitable
and reasonable manner.”9  According to Article 5, to be
equitable and reasonable the use must also be consistent
with adequate protection of the watercourse from
pollution and other forms of degradation.
But how does upstream State A, for example, know
whether its use of an international watercourse is
equitable and reasonable vis-à-vis downstream States B
and C?  The answer is, this may be a very difficult thing
for State A to determine, in the absence of a joint
mechanism with States B and C, or a very close working
relationship with them.  Article 6 of the Convention sets
forth a non-exhaustive list of factors to be taken into
account in making the determination, and Article 9
requires riparian states to exchange data and information
concerning the condition of the watercourse on a regular
basis.  The Article 6 factors will doubtless be of assistance
to State A in making the equitable utilization
determination, as will the Article 9 data and information
– indeed, it would be nearly impossible for a state to
ensure that its use was equitable without data and
information from other riparian states.  But the principle
of equitable utilization is much better suited to
implementation through very close cooperation between
the states concerned, ideally through a joint commission,
or by a court or other third party.  After all, the doctrine
largely originated in the equitable apportionment
decisions of the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in
disputes between U.S. states.  This having been said,
however, it seems clear that there is no other general
principle that can take into account adequately the wide
spectrum of factors that may come into play with regard
to international watercourses throughout the world.  
Thus it is crucial that riparian states cooperate with a
view to achieving a regime of equitable and reasonable
utilization and participation for an international
watercourse system as a whole.  Article 8 of the
Convention lays down a general obligation to cooperate
“in order to attain optimal utilization and adequate
protection of an international watercourse.”  It is
interesting to note that the delegations negotiating the
Convention attached such significance to cooperation
through joint mechanisms that they added a paragraph to
Article 8 calling for states to “consider the establishment
of [such] mechanisms or commissions . . . .”
Returning for a moment to Article 5, that provision also
introduces the new concept of equitable participation.
The basic idea behind this concept is that in order to
achieve a regime of equitable and reasonable utilization,
riparian states must often cooperate with each other by
taking affirmative steps, individually or jointly, with
regard to the watercourse.  While this idea is, in effect, a
feature of some well-developed cooperative relationships
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between river basin countries, it had not been reflected as
such in attempts to codify the law in this field until the
International Law Commission included it in Article 5.
Its acceptance as a part of the Convention is welcome,
because it helps to convey the message that a regime of
equitable utilization of an international watercourse
system, together with the protection and preservation of
its ecosystems, cannot be achieved solely through
individual action by each riparian state acting in
isolation; again, affirmative cooperation will often be
necessary.  The World Court recognized the utility of this
concept, as well as the salience of the Convention itself,
when it quoted the entire paragraph of Article 5 that sets
forth the obligation of equitable participation in its
judgment in the Gabíkovo-Nagymaros case.10
The most controversial provision of the entire Convention
was the obligation not to cause significant harm, set forth
in Article 7.  At first blush it seems obvious that one state
should not cause significant harm to another state,
whether through its use of shared water resources or
otherwise.  But, at least in the case of international
watercourses, it is not so simple.  Suppose, for example,
that – as is often the case – upstream State A historically
has not developed its water resources significantly
because of its mountainous terrain.  The topography of
the downstream states on the watercourse, B and C, is
flatter, and they have used the watercourse extensively for
irrigation for centuries, if not millennia.  State A now
wishes to develop its water resources for hydroelectric
and agricultural purposes.  States B and C cry foul, on the
ground that this would significantly harm their
established uses.  How should the positions of State A, on
the one hand, and States B and C, on the other – neither
of which seems unreasonable on its face – be reconciled?
This question is at the heart of the controversy over
Article 7 and its relationship with Article 5 on equitable
and reasonable utilization.  Much depends upon how the
so-called “no significant harm” obligation should be
formulated:  The International Law Commission's first
draft of the article, adopted in 1991, was the essence of
simplicity: “Watercourse States shall utilize an
international watercourse in such a way as not to cause
appreciable harm to other watercourse States.”  The
Commission's final draft, adopted in 1994, introduced
considerable flexibility into the text, in two principal
respects.  First, it expressly made the obligation one of
“due diligence”:  “Watercourse States shall exercise due
diligence to utilize an international watercourse in such
a way as not to cause significant harm . . . [etc.].”  This
made it clear beyond any doubt that the obligation was
not in any way absolute, but rather one of due diligence,
or best efforts under the circumstances.  The second way
in which flexibility was introduced was by adding a
lengthy second paragraph, which converted the “no-
harm” obligation into what the ILC called “a process
aimed at avoiding significant harm as far as possible
while reaching an equitable result in each concrete
case.”11
The UN Working Group that negotiated the Convention
made several changes to the ILC's text of Article 7.
While scholars will undoubtedly debate the significance
of the changes, it does not appear that they change the
substance of the article.  The deletion of the reference to
“due diligence” from paragraph 1 and its replacement
with the phrase “take all appropriate measures” is merely
saying the same thing in different words.  The real fight
was over the second paragraph, which squarely raised the
issue whether equitable utilization should prevail over the
“no-harm” obligation, or vice-versa.  The problem may be
illustrated using the hypothetical fact situation set out
above.  If equitable utilization is the controlling legal
principle, upstream State A may develop its water
resources in a manner that is equitable and reasonable
vis-à-vis downstream States B and C, even though that
development would cause some significant harm to their
established uses.  If, on the other hand, the obligation not
to cause significant harm is dominant, State A could
engage in no development, no matter how equitable and
reasonable, that would cause States B and C significant
harm, absent their agreement.
To some delegations at the UN negotiations, the ILC's
final text – which represents an effort to strike a balance
between the two principles – favored equitable utilization
too heavily.  They argued for a text that more clearly gave
precedence to the “no-harm” principle.  Other delegations
took the opposite position.  In their view the basic rule
was equitable utilization; at most, any harm to another
riparian state should merely be one factor to be taken into
account in determining whether the harming state's use
was equitable.  Perhaps not surprisingly, the compromise
formula arrived at in the UN negotiations is a bit like a
buffet: there is something in it for everyone.  No matter
whether one adheres to the equitable utilization or the no-
harm school, one can claim at least partial victory.
However, close examination of the text of paragraph 2 of
Article 7 indicates that it gives precedence to equitable
utilization over the no-harm doctrine.  The very existence
of a second paragraph implicitly acknowledging that
harm may be caused without engaging the harming state's
responsibility (liability) supports this conclusion.  Also
indicating a recognition that significant harm may have
to be tolerated by a riparian state are the numerous
mitigating clauses in paragraph 2.  Finally, the
proposition that the “no-harm” rule does not enjoy
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inherent preeminence is supported by Article 10 of the
Convention, which provides that any conflict between
uses of an international watercourse is to be resolved
“with reference to articles 5 to 7 . . . .”  This would
presumably mean that if State A's hydroelectric use
conflicts with State B's agricultural use, the conflict is not
to be resolved solely by applying the “no-harm” rule of
Article 7, but rather through reference to the “package”
of articles setting forth the principles of both equitable
utilization and “no-harm.”
But in actual disputes, it seems probable that the facts and
circumstances of each case, rather than any a priori rule,
will ultimately be the key determinants of the rights and
obligations of the parties.  Difficult cases, of which there
are bound to be many in the future, are more likely to be
resolved by cooperation and compromise, than by rigid
insistence on rules of law.  This is one of the lessons of
the World Court's judgment in the Gabíkovo-Nagymaros
case.  It is also a proposition that is supported by the fact
that many of the next century’s international water
problems are likely to arise in developing countries,
whose water projects will usually require financing by a
donor community that will insist on win-win solutions
produced through cooperation and compromise rather
than zero-sum solutions that may result from mechanical
application of rules of law.
Before leaving the “General Principles” chapter of the
Convention, an additional word about Article 10 is in
order.  Originally conceived as a provision that would
clearly specify that navigational uses no longer enjoy
inherent priority over non-navigational ones – if they ever
did –  this article now has a much richer texture.  In
particular, paragraph 2 provides that a conflict between
different kinds of uses of an international watercourse is
to be “resolved with reference to articles 5 to 7, with
special regard being given to the requirements of vital
human needs.”  The expression “vital human needs” was
discussed at some length in the UN negotiations.  The
final text maintains the ILC's language but a “statement
of understanding” of the Working Group, which
accompanies the text of the Convention, indicates that:
“In determining 'vital human needs,' special attention is
to be paid to providing sufficient water to sustain human
life, including both drinking water and water required for
production of food in order to prevent starvation.”  While
on its face this proposition seems unassailable, some
countries may fear that the concept of “vital human
needs” could become a loophole, enabling a state to argue
that its use should prevail on this ground when in fact it
was highly debatable whether vital human needs were
involved at all.  But since the “statement of
understanding” is based on the ILC's commentary to the
article, which would in any event be relevant to an
interpretation of paragraph 2, the “statement” probably
adds no new problems.
Part III of the Convention, Planned Measures, contains a
set of procedures to be followed in relation to a new
activity in one state that may have a significant adverse
effect on other states sharing an international
watercourse.  The fact that the basic obligation to provide
prior notification of such changes was accepted as a part
of the Convention by most delegations12 is, in itself,
important: it provides further evidence that the
international community as a whole emphatically rejects
the notion that a state has unfettered discretion to do as it
alone wishes with the portion of an international
watercourse within its territory.13
The system envisaged in Part III essentially provides that
a state contemplating a new use or a change in an
existing use of an international watercourse that may
have a significant adverse effect on other riparian states
must provide prior notification to the potentially affected
states.  Those states are then given six months within
which to respond.  If they object to the planned use, they
are to enter into discussions with the notifying state “with
a view to arriving at an equitable resolution of the
situation.”  This process could take twelve months or
longer.  If the matter is not resolved to the satisfaction of
any of the states concerned, the dispute settlement
procedures of Article 33 of the Convention would be
applicable.
Part IV of the Convention entitled Protection,
Preservation, and Management, contains what might be
called the “environmental” provisions of the Convention.
While a variety of proposals were made in the UN
negotiations for the strengthening of these provisions, in
the end only minor changes were made to the ILC's text.
Article 20, Protection and Preservation of Ecosystems, is
a simple but potentially quite powerful provision.  It says
that riparian states have an obligation to “protect and
preserve the ecosystems of international watercourses.”
Like Article 192 of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, on which it is modeled, this obligation is
not qualified.  For example, it does not say that the
ecosystems must be protected only if failure to do so may
harm another state sharing the watercourse.  Since the
“ecosystems” of international watercourses include land
areas contiguous to them, Article 20 requires that such
land areas be maintained in such a way that the
watercourses they border are not harmed by, for example,
excessive agricultural runoff or other forms of non-point
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source pollution.  It is likely that this is not an absolute
obligation, however.14  That is, it is probably an
obligation to exercise due diligence to protect and
preserve watercourse ecosystems.  This standard takes
into account the sensitivity of the ecosystem as well as the
capability of the state involved.
Pollution of international watercourses is addressed
specifically in Article 21, Prevention, Reduction and
Control of Pollution.  That article uses the standard
formula – also employed in Article 194 of the Law of the
Sea Convention – that riparian states must “prevent,
reduce and control” pollution of international
watercourses.  Unlike Article 20, however, this obligation
is qualified.  It is triggered only if the pollution “may
cause significant harm to other watercourse States or to
their environment . . . .”  Of course, it is at least arguable
that pollution that would harm only the environment of
the state of origin would have to be controlled pursuant to
Article 20.
Article 22 requires riparian states to prevent the
introduction of alien or new species into international
watercourses.  The ecological and economic havoc that
such species can wreak is all too well illustrated by the
accidental introduction of the zebra mussel into the
waters of the Great Lakes region.  The mollusk, which
arrived in the ballast water of a ship from Europe in the
mid-1980s, is responsible for millions of dollars of
damage to shipping and other economic activities and
threatens potentially disastrous biological harm as well.
In a more recent case, in October 1998, California state
Fish and Game authorities poisoned Lake Davis to rid it
of a voracious introduced species, the northern pike, even
though the lake supplies drinking water for surrounding
communities.  Ironically, the pike survived while native
trout were eliminated from the lake.  Like Article 21, the
obligation contained in Article 22 applies only where
significant harm will be caused to other riparian states,
but it would seem that this would often be the case given
the propensity of non-native species to proliferate and
spread.
Article 23 addresses, in a very general way, the problem
of marine pollution from land-based sources.  Like
Article 20, the obligation applies whether or not other
states are injured.  Article 23 actually goes beyond the
problem of pollution, however.  Since it requires riparian
states to “protect and preserve the marine environment,”
it would presumably apply also to such things as the
protection of anadromous species and coral reefs.  
In a “statement of understanding” the Working Group
indicated that Articles 21 to 23 “impose a due diligence
standard on watercourse States.”  It is interesting that this
statement does not cover Article 20.  But, as indicated
earlier, the obligation contained in Article 20 is probably
also one of due diligence.
“Management” of international watercourses is addressed
in Article 24, which provides that states sharing
freshwater resources are to enter into consultations, at the
request of any of them, concerning the joint management
of those resources.  This provision is believed by some
specialists to be too modest in view of the importance of
joint commissions in the management, protection, and
development of international watercourses.  But while
riparians of a particular river may always decide to
establish a joint management mechanism, neither the ILC
nor the Working Group believed it was appropriate to
require the formation of such bodies in a general,
framework instrument like the Convention.  While this
conclusion seems correct, the article could have gone
somewhat farther in indicating the concrete forms that
institutionalized cooperation between riparian states
might take.  But some states – and indeed some members
of the ILC – were somewhat uncomfortable even with the
article as it presently stands, let alone a more specific
provision.
The proper construction and maintenance of dams and
similar works is dealt with in Article 26, Installations.
Since a faulty dam may pose great danger to downstream
states, this article requires that a state in whose territory
a dam is located maintain it and protect it from forces
that may result in harm to other riparian states.
Part V is entitled “Harmful Conditions and Emergency
Situations.”  It contains one article on each of those
topics.  The expression “harmful conditions” covers a
wide variety of phenomena, such as water-borne diseases,
ice floes, siltation, and erosion.  Article 27 requires
riparian states to take “all appropriate measures” to
prevent or mitigate such conditions, where they may be
harmful to other states sharing the watercourse.  Article
28 deals with “emergency situations.”  This term is
defined broadly to include both natural phenomena such
as floods and those that are caused by humans, such as
chemical spills.  A state within whose territory such an
emergency originates must notify other potentially
affected states as well as competent international
organizations.  It must also take “all practicable measures
. . . to prevent, mitigate, and eliminate harmful effects of
the emergency.”
Part VI, Miscellaneous Provisions, contains five articles,
two of which are of interest for present purposes.  Article
32 deals essentially with private remedies for damage
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occasioned through the medium of an international
watercourse.  Entitled “Non-discrimination,” its intent is
to ensure equality of access by injured or threatened
parties to judicial or administrative procedures in the
state of origin of the harm, regardless of the intervening
international boundary.  The article provoked controversy
in the UN negotiations including a proposal that it be
deleted.  Evidently not all states are yet comfortable with
the idea of granting private persons from other (usually
neighboring) countries nondiscriminatory access to their
judicial and administrative procedures relating to
transboundary harm or the threat thereof.
Article 33 on the settlement of disputes was also
somewhat controversial, principally because it provides
for compulsory fact-finding at the request of any party to
a dispute.  Any compulsory dispute-settlement procedure
is bound to draw strong objection from certain countries,15
even if all that is compulsory is fact-finding, and even if
that only becomes compulsory after negotiations have
failed to settle the dispute within six months.  In this case
their ranks were swelled somewhat by a few upstream
states,16 who were evidently reluctant to surrender
whatever leverage their position on an international
watercourse confers upon them.  Yet facts are of critical
significance with regard to the core obligations of the
Convention.  For example, how can states determine
whether their utilization is “equitable and reasonable”
under article 5 without an agreed factual basis?  And how
can a state establish that it has sustained significant harm
if the state that is alleged to have caused the harm denies
that it has caused it or that any harm has been suffered?
The importance of facts in this field is no doubt what led
the ILC to depart from its usual practice by including an
article on dispute settlement in its draft.  Article 33 also
provides for states to declare upon becoming parties to the
Convention that they accept as compulsory the
submission of disputes to the International Court of
Justice or to arbitration in accordance with procedures set
out in the Annex to the Convention.
TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE CONVENTION
REFLECT INTERNATIONAL LAW?
The Convention would appear to confirm the status in
general, or customary international law of three
principles: equitable utilization, prevention of significant
harm, and prior notification of planned measures.  Each
of these principles has substantial independent support, as
demonstrated in the ILC’s commentary and in the reports
of the Commission’s respective special rapporteurs.  But
the fact that the principles were accepted by a diplomatic
conference open to universal participation leaves little
doubt as to their status as generally recognized principles
of international law.  It is equally clear, however, that the
relationship of the equitable utilization and no-harm
principles remains controversial.  The resolution of this
question in the Convention, while not a model of clarity,
strongly suggests that the overriding principle is that of
equitable utilization.  The World Court’s judgment in the
Gabíkovo-Nagymaros case would appear to support this
conclusion.  In its judgment, the Court referred on several
occasions to the principle of equitable utilization (e.g., to
Hungary's “basic right to an equitable and reasonable
sharing of the resources of an international
watercourse).”17  On the other hand, the Court did not
once mention the no-harm principle (except in relation to
environmental harm generally), despite its having been
relied upon heavily by Hungary. 
In addition to these principles, the Convention reflects
what is probably an emerging principle of customary law
in the field of shared freshwater resources; namely, that
states must protect the ecosystems of international
watercourses.  Modern agreements increasingly provide
for such protection, reflecting a recognition on the part of
states of the importance of safeguarding the integrity of
freshwater ecosystems.  The protection called for is broad,
encompassing not only the water itself, but also land
areas that are related to, and influence the health of,
aquatic ecosystems.  Thus it is important not only to
prevent, reduce, and control the pollution of international
watercourses, but also to preserve riparian “buffer zones”
so that freshwater species and the water itself is not
degraded by activities on the land.
OUTLOOK
Ratification of the Convention is proceeding slowly.
Thirty-five ratifications are necessary for the agreement
to enter into force as to the states that have ratified it.
However, even if the Convention never enters into force,
it is likely that it will still be of significant value for
several reasons, some of which have already been alluded
to.  First, it was based upon, and hews closely to a draft
prepared by the International Law Commission (ILC), the
United Nations body responsible for the “progressive
development of international law and its codification.”18
As is its practice, the ILC did not indicate which of the
provisions codify the law (i.e., set forth existing rules)
and which progressively develop it.  But it seems clear
that the most important elements of the Convention –
equitable utilization, prevention of harm, prior
notification – are, in large measure, codifications of
existing norms.  That the Working Group did not
fundamentally alter the approach of the International Law
Commission betokens general satisfaction with the ILC's
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efforts at codification and progressive development of the
law in this field.  The Report of the Working Group to the
General Assembly notes: “Throughout the elaboration of
the draft Convention, reference had been made to the
commentaries to the draft articles prepared by the
International Law Commission to clarify the contents of
the articles.”19  The Court in the Gabíkovo-Nagymaros
case cited the famous passage in the River Oder judgment
concerning the “community of interests” of states in a
navigable river,20 then said:
“Modern development of international law has
strengthened this principle for non-navigational uses of
international watercourses as well, as evidenced by the
adoption of the Convention of 21 May 1997 on the Law
of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses by the United Nations General Assembly.”21
In this fascinating sentence, the Court refers to the
Convention as “evidence” of the principle of the “perfect
equality of all riparian States,” notwithstanding that the
Convention had not at that time been ratified by a single
state.  Even the provisions of the Convention that do not
reflect current law are likely to give rise to expectations
of behavior on the part of riparian states that may, over
time,22 ripen into international obligations.
Second, the Convention will be of value even if it does
not enter into force because it was negotiated in a forum
in which virtually any interested state could participate.
It is the only convention of a universal character on
international watercourses.  The convention was adopted
by a weighty majority of countries, with only three
negative votes, indicating broad agreement in the
international community on the general principles
governing the non-navigational uses of international
watercourses.  These considerations mean that if the
Convention does enter into force, it will have significant
bearing upon controversies between states, one or more of
which is not a party to the Convention.  In addition, the
Convention may be of value in interpreting other general
or specific agreements concerning international
watercourses that are binding on the parties to a
controversy, whether or not the Convention is itself
binding on those parties.23
Third, even before the Convention's adoption, the ILC's
draft articles on which it was based had influenced the
drafting of specific agreements.  These include the 1995
Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems in the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) Region,24 the
1991 Protocol on Common Water Resources concluded
between Argentina and Chile,25 and the 1995 Agreement
on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of
the Mekong River Basin.26  It is likely that with the
adoption of the Convention, states negotiating future
agreements will resort to its provisions as a starting
point.27
Thus, in the words of Ambassador Tello of Mexico,
introducing the draft General Assembly resolution
containing the Convention, “This instrument undoubtedly
marks an important step in the progressive development
and codification of international law . . . .”28  It does not
go as far as it might have in some areas,29 and goes
farther than some states would have liked in others.30
The sponsors of the resolution containing the Convention
declared that they were “convinced” that it “will
contribute to the equitable and reasonable use of
transboundary water resources and their ecosystems, as
well as to their preservation, to the benefit of current and
future generations,” and that it “will contribute to
enhancing cooperation and communication among
riparian States of international watercourses . . . .”31  In
its resolution first calling for negotiation of a convention,
the General Assembly declared its conviction “that
successful codification and progressive development of
the rules of international law governing the non-
navigational uses of international watercourses would
assist in promoting and implementing the purposes and
principles set forth in Articles 1 and 2 of the [UN]
Charter.”32  Now that the work has been completed, it
seems fair to conclude that the Convention will indeed
assist in promoting and implementing those purposes and
principles.
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Work on a Watercourses Convention, 91 AJIL 374
(1997); and McCaffrey & Sinjela, supra note *.
2. REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION ON
THE WORK OF ITS FORTY-SIXTH SESSION, U.N. GAOR,
49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, p. 197, U.N. Doc. A/49/10
(1994) (hereafter referred to as 1994 ILC Report).  See
Stephen McCaffrey, The International Law Commission
Adopts Draft Articles on International Watercourses, 89
AJIL 395 (1995).
3.  The ILC included the topic in its general program of
work in 1971.  It began study of the topic in 1974 with
the establishment of a sub-committee and the
appointment of the first of five special rapporteurs.  See,
e.g., 1985 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 68
(1986).
4.  UNGA Res. 2669 (XXV) of 8 Dec. 1970.
5. Verbatim record, 99th plenary meeting, U.N. General
Assembly, 21 May 1997, U.N. Doc. A/51/PV.99, pp. 5
(Pakistan) and 12 (Rwanda) (hereafter Verbatim record).
6. See generally Stephen McCaffrey, Seventh Report on
the Law of the Non-Navigational Use of International
Watercourses, [1991] Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, vol. 2, pt. 1,
p. 45, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add.1 (Part 2). 
7. 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, at 135.
8. See Case concerning the Gabíkovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hungary/Slovakia), judgment of 25 Sept. 1997, 1997 ICJ
7, para. 78, p. 51.
9. Ibid., para. 150, p. 80.
10. Ibid., para. 147, p. 80.
11. 1994 ILC Report, supra note 2, at 103.
12. Three that did not were Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Turkey.
Verbatim record, supra note 5, pp. 4-5 (Turkey), 12
(Rwanda) and 9 (Ethiopia).  In explaining its negative
vote on the Convention, Turkey stated that Part III
introduces a "veto."  Id., p. 5.  While it is true that the
articles provide for a temporary suspensive effect upon
implementation of measures by the planning state (see
Articles 13 and 17), no veto is provided for in Part III.
13. The doctrine of “absolute territorial sovereignty,”
which would support such unfettered discretion, has long
been rejected by the state in which it was invented.  See
Stephen McCaffrey, The Harmon Doctrine One Hundred
Years Later: Buried, Not Praised," 36 NAT. RES. J. 725
(1996).
14. But this is not certain, especially in view of the failure
of the Working Group to include Article 20 in the group
of articles (21-23) that, according to a “statement of
understanding,” impose only a due diligence obligation.
15. E.g., China and India.  Verbatim record, supra note 5,
pp. 7 (China) and 9 (India).
16. E.g., France, Israel, (effectively upstream on the
Jordan) and Rwanda.  These states, together with China
and India, generally maintained that the principle of free
choice of means should have been followed in Article 33.
Verbatim record, supra note 5, pp. 8 (France), 11 (Israel)
and 12 (Rwanda).  In a separate vote on Article 33 in the
Working Group, the following five countries voted in the
negative: China, Colombia, France, India and Turkey.
The tally was 33 for, 5 against, with 25 abstentions.  See
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/51/SR.62, at 10, para. 86 (1997).
17. 1997 ICJ 7, para. 78, p. 54.
18. UNITED NATIONS, STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW COMMISSION, Art. 1(1), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/4/Rev.2
(1982).
19. Report of the Sixth Committee convening as the
Working Group of the Whole, U.N. Doc. A/51/869, at 6
(1997), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 719 (1997). 
20. Territorial Jurisdiction of the International
Commission of the River Oder, Judgment No. 16, 1929,
P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 23, p. 27.
21. 1997 ICJ 7, para. 85, p. 56.
22. How much time depends upon a number of factors,
including the intensity of the practice, its generality, etc.
It should also be recalled in this connection that norms
may develop as a matter of regional or special, as opposed
to universal, custom.  See generally ANTHONY D'AMATO,
THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch.
8, pp. 233, et seq. (1971).
23. While the intent of the parties at the time of a treaty's
conclusion  obviously cannot be disregarded,
developments in the law may be relevant to the treaty's
interpretation.  See the statement of the ICJ in the
Namibia Advisory opinion that where matters involved
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“were not static but were by definition evolutionary “, the
provision in question would be interpreted “within the
framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the
time of its interpretation.”  Legal Consequences for
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16, 31,
para. 53 (Advisory Opinion of June 21).  The conception
of international watercourses, and the law governing
them, have without question evolved considerably during
the present century.  See, e.g., Stephen McCaffrey, The
Evolution of the Law of International Watercourses, 45
AUSTRIAN J. PUB. & INT'L L., p. 87 (1993).
24. Signed at Maseru, Lesotho, 16 May 1995 (copy on file
with the author).
25. INTEGRACIÓN LATINOAMERICANA, REVISTA MENSUAL
DEL INTAL, Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 116.
26. 5 Apr. 1995, 34 I.L.M. 864 (1995).
27. The convention has had major influence on the
development of the law in other fields as well.  This is
particularly true of the on-going work by the ilc on
international liability for injurious consequences arising
out of acts not prohibited by international law.  Many of
the provisions contained in the draft articles on
prevention of transboundary damage from hazardous
activities adopted by the ilc on first reading in 1998
follow closely the provisions of the watercourses
convention.  See report of the international law
commission on the work of its forty-eighth session, pp.
18-69, un gaor, 53d sess., supp. 10, un doc. A/53/10
(1998). 
28. Verbatim record, supra note 5, p. 2.
29. For example, a significant group of delegations
believed its provisions concerning pollution and the
ecosystems of international watercourses could have been
strengthened, as noted above.
30. For example, the provisions of Part III drew fire from
some delegations, as noted earlier. However, they were
strongly supported by others. That they survived the
negotiation process bespeaks their overall balance.
31. Verbatim record, supra note 5, p. 2.
32.U.N. G.A. Res. 49/52, 9 Dec. 1994, pmbl,
U.N.G.A.O.R., 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, Vol. 1 (pmbl.),
U.N. Doc. A/49/49 (1994).
